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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE,
Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff,
and Appellant,
vs
CARL R. SESSIONS,
Third-Party Denfendant

Case No.
11350

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff and
respondent, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company,
to recover from the defend ant, Farmers Insurance
Exchange, the amount of $676.18 under an alleged
right of subrogation arising from the payment of
medical expenses to the plaintiff's insured under
the provisions of the plaintiff's policy of insurance.
Defendant contends that there is no such right of
subrogation in the State of Utah, and secondly that
even if there is the plaintiff herein did not give sufficient notice to the defendant of its subrogation
1

interest and therefore is precluded from making recovery from the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After defendant's motion to dismiss had been
denied the plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment which was granted awarding to the plaintiff the amount of $676.18, interest, and costs of
court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the
lower court's summary judgment in plaintiff's favor
and dismiss plaintiff's actions on the grounds that
as a matter of law there exists no such right of subrogation. If, however, this Court holds that there
is such a right of subrogation defendant requests
the Court to remand the case to the lower court to
determine the factual question of whether defendant
had sufficient notice of plaintiff's right of subrogation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts here are essentially without dispute.
On June 27, 1967, at the Geneva Steel parking lot
in Utah County, one Doyle Sweat backed his 1956
Chevrolet truck into a 1967 Buick Riviera owned
and occupied at said time by Carl R. Sessions resulting in property damage and personal injuries to
Carl R. Session.
2

At the time of said accident, Carl R. Sessions
was an insured under an automobile liability policy
issued by the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, which policy of insurance contained
a coverage known as Medical Pay Coverage, under
which State Farm was required to pay up to $1,000
for medical expenses incurred by Carl R. Sessions,
which in said accident amounted to $676.18. Said
policy of insurance provided that the insurer, State
Farm, would be subrogated against the third party
tort feasor for the amounts paid under said medical
pay coverage, and said policy in addition provided
that the insured should execute and deliver instruments and do whatever necessary to secure such
subrogation rights for the insurer and that the insured should do nothing after the loss to prejudice
such subrogation rights. On the other hand Doyle
Sweat was on said date insured under an automobile
liability policy issued by defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, covering him for any liability arising from said accident.
On August 4, 1967, respondent through its
Senior Field Claims Representative, Martin Young,
wrote a letter to the appellant which stated as follows:
"We have been informed that you are the
insurance carrier for the party designated as
your insured in the caption of this letter.
"Our investigation establishes that your
insured was responsible for this accident. The
3

purpose of this letter is to inform you that
we have collision and medical payments cov.
erage on the above policy, both being written
on a subrogation basis.
"While we have not been called upon to
make payment under these coverages we wish
to go on record of our possible interest and
ask that you proceed accordingly.
"We wish to thank you for your cooperation and if we can assist you in any way
please advise.
Yours very truly,
Martin Young"
On the same day Martin Young mailed drafts for
Sessions's medical expenses of $676.18. (Exhibit

P-1)

Five days later on August 9, 1967, defendant
Farmers in behalf of its insured Doyle Sweat entered into a settlement with said Carl R. Sessions for
any and all claims he may have against Sweat and
Farmers arising from said accident, paying him
$4,127.87 and receiving from Sessions a full and
general release.
Subsequent to said settlement State Farm made
demand upon defendant Farmers for reimbursement of said amount, which Farmers denied in a
letter dated October 19, 1967. State Farm then filed
the present action seeking to recover $676.18 under
its alleges subrogation rights. Defendant Farmers
filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground
4

that a cause of action had not been stated, in particular that as a matter of law no right of subrogation
of medical expenses exists in the State of Utah, and
that in addition respondent's insured Sessions was
a necessary party to said action inasmuch as he totally released appellant from any further liability
to defendant or its insured. The lower court denied
the motion, and appellant filed its answer. Appellant then on leave of court filed a third party complaint against Carl R. Sessions alleging that if anyone was liable to State Farm it was Sessions since
he recovered his medical expenses twice and executed a full and complete release to appellant. Service
was not accomplished on Sessions inasmuch as he
had moved to Montana. Respondent then filed a motion for summary judgment without affidavit or
other evidence offered. At the hearing of said motion appellant denied plaintiff's right of subrogation
and questioned the adequacy of respondent's notice
of August 4, 1967 (Exhibit D-2) and raised the
issue of whether payment of said medical expenses
had been made prior to appellant's settlement with
Sessions in response to which State Farm offered
in evidence Exhibit P-1 showing payments of the
medical expenses on August 4, 1967. After hearing
counsels' argument and reviewing the Memorandums of Law filed previously in defendant's motion
to dismiss, the court granted plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment holding that as a matter of law
respondent had a right to subrogate against the de5

fendant on the medical expense payments and that
the notice of August 4 constituted adequate notice.
Appellant takes issue with both holdings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT IN FINDING THAT AS
A MATTER OF LAW A RIGHT OF SUBROGATION EXISTS IN BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
STATE FARM FOR MEDICAL PAYMENTS
ERRED INASMUCH AS SAID SUBROGATION
VIOLA'TES PUB LI C P 0 LI C Y AND IS
AGAINST THE LAW AS AN ASSIGNMENT
OF AN ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
AND AS A SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION.

Medical expenses are an obvious element of a
personal injury action. This principal is acknowledged in the cases cited below and is generally stated
in 22 Am Jur 2d §102 page 149: "One of the principal elements of damages in a personal injury action
is the value of medical expenses."
The first and most obvious objection to the defendant's alleged right of subrogation is that in the
State of Utah and in most other states it is clearly
the law that a cause of action for personal injuries
is not assignable. In 40 ALR 2nd 502 numerous cases
are cited espousing the common law rule which forbids the assignments of causes of action for personal
injury. The Utah cases generally in agreement with
the common law rule are Fritz vs. Wes tern Union
Telegraph Company, 25 Utah 263, 71 Pac. 209 (Dic6

turn, 1903); Mayer vs. Rankin, 91Utah193, 63 Pac.
2nd 611 (1936). The most recent pronouncement
on this point is in the case of In Re Behm's Estate,
117 Utah 151, 213 Pac. 2nd 657, wherein the court
held on page 662 in the Pacific Report that the cause
of action for personal injury was not assignable.
The court further held that the owner of the cause
of action could assign the proceeds from the cause
of action but that he would have to prosecute the
action himself and could not tr an sfer the ownership of the cause of action.
The rule of non-assignability of an action for
personal injuries has extensive historical roots,
which are still pertinent to the present scene. Numerous courts in recent years have faced the identical problem contained in this case and have reaffirmed the non-assignability of all or a portion of a
personal injury claim. A case directly in point with
the present action is that of Harleysville Mutual
Insurance Company vs. Lea, 410 Pac. 2nd 495, Arizona (1966). In that case Harleysville Mutual issued an automobile insurance policy to Lea which contained medical expense coverage. Lea was involved
in an accident resulting in bodily injury to himself.
Harleysville paid to Lea the amount of $620.98 for
medical expenses and Lea in turn signed a receipt
and release in behalf of Harleysville subrogating it
to Lea's claim against the tort feasor for medical
expenses. Lea then subsequently entered into a settlement with the tort feasor and refused to reim7

burse Harleysville to the extent of the benefits paid
by Harleysville under its medical provisions. Har.
leysville then brought a suit against Lea for the
amount of the medical payments. At trial Lea moved
to dismiss, which motion was granted. On appeal the
Arizona Court of Appeals pointed out that whether
or not the subrogation rights arose from the policy
or from the receipt and release, the question was
nevertheless whether or not Lea had the ability in
law to assign in whole or in part his cause of action
for personal injuries to Harleysville. Harleysville
argued that the historical rule of non-assignability
of personal injury actions had been abrogated in
Arizona inasmuch as the Arizona legislature had
recently passed a statute which provided for causes ,
of action to survive except that on the death of the ,
person injured the damages for pain and suffering
of such person did not survive. That decision is directly in point with the present case inasmuch as
respondent here claims that the recently enacted
Utah statute, 78-11-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
1967 Pocket Supplement, has changed the rule in
Utah in regards to the survivability of actions for
medical and funeral expenses. That section is identical with the newly enacted Arizona statute which
the Arizona court held to be irrelevant to the question of assignability of such causes of action. The
court there held that it mattered not whether an
action for personal injuries survived in whole or in
part, the point being that it was against public
1
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1
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policy of the State of Arizona to allow the assignment of causes of action for personal injuries. The
court indicated that unscrupulous people would purchase causes of action for personal injury and thereby traffic in personal injury lawsuits, which obviously is a very real possibility should said causes of
action be assignable. The Arizona court then went
on to point out that other states had also come to
the same conclusion under similar facts using the
basis of public policy as well as other reasons. The
court referred to the California case of Peller vs.
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 34 Cal.
Rep. 41 ( 1963). There an action for declaratory
relief was brought by the insured against his own
insurer alleging that the insurer would not make
payment under the medical payments provisions of
his policy unless he entered into a subrogation agreement and assigned the right or recovery in the personal injury action to the extent of the medical expense payment to the insurer. The trial court granted a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
plaintiff insured. On appeal the appellate court upheld the rule of non-assignability of a cause of action arising out of personal injuries. The insurer in
that case attempted to label the subrogation as an
indemnity; however, the court rejected this stating
that the distinction was purely verbal in that the
legal effect of the policy provisions is the same regardless of what term is attached to the procedure
since the result is to transfer the insured's cause
9

of action against third-party tort feasor to the insurer. The court held that such right of subrogation
could only come by the direct act of the California
legislature and not by a court-made law. The comt ,
also referred to the cases of Nielson Realty Corporation vs. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnificatfon
Corporation, 262 N.Y.S. 2nd 652 ( 1965) ; Bethlehem Fabricators vs. H. D. Watts Company, 190 N.E.
828( 1934); and Hereford vs. Meek, 62 S.E. 2nd
740, West Virginia ( 1949). The court then referred
to another recent case directly on point - Travelers
lndeninity Company vs. Chumbley, 394 S.W. 2nd
418 ( 1965). There the insurer had sued its insured
and the third-party tort feasor to recover the amount
of medical payments which it had paid to its insured.. The insurer's policy had the usual subrogation
provision. The insurer had paid to the insured his
claim for medical expenses and had given notice of
said alleged subrogation right to the tort feasor.
Subsequently the insured settled with the tort feasor.
Both the defendants made motions to dismiss the
action, which were on the basis that neither stated a
cause of action. The lower court granted both motions. On appeal the court affirmed the dismissal as
to both the insured and the tort feasor. In doing so
the court held that Missouri followed the common
law rule prohibiting the assignment of a cause of
action for personal injuries and that such purported
assignment of the right to recover the medical expenses was a violation of said rule. The court indi10

cated one objection to allowing subrogation on the
medical payments would be that if it were so allowed all automobile insurers and other health and accident insurers would insist upon subrogation as to
medical payments, thus resulting in multiple subrogation claims. The court said in that regard:
" ... And, so it seems to us, multiple subrogation claims inevitably would lead to conflicts and disputes between subrogation claimants, would complicate and make more difficult the negotiation of voluntary settlements
with third-party tort feasors, and would encourage and promote suits in interpleaders,
all running counter to the policy of the law."
The court felt it would be lifting the lid on a Pandora's box to allow subrogation of medical expenses
to be an exception to the well-established rule of
non-assignability. It is also interesting to note that
in the Chumbley case the insurer argued that medical expenses should be treated as property damage.
The court rejected this saying that the medical expenses arose directly from the bodily injury and
were an integral element of the personal injury
cause of action, and that such medical expenses stood
on a much different footing than property damage
and therefore was not assignable. The court said
in that regard:
" ... Noting only in passing that the case
at bar presents a novel and unique situation
in which plaintiff not only would split the
cause of action for personal injury by severing therefrom the claim for medical expenses
1·1

but also would fragment that claim by dividing it between the plaintiff and Chumbley
$500 to the former and the remainder to th~
latter."
In addition to the reasons given by the above cases,
the Arizona court also put forth the following as a
further basis for its holding:
" ... In the instant case we have a contract of insurance entered into prior to the
accident providing for payments under the
medical pay provision portion of the contract.
The insured paid a premium for this policy
and is entitled to the medical payment regardless of any further action he may take in
bringing suit against the tort feasor. Should
he recover after suit and trial, he will have to
pay a portion of his recovery for attorneys'
fees and costs, and expense which the appellant herein ignores in demanding the return
of the full amount paid to the appellee. To require the insured to subrogate these funds or
to assign the amount to the insurer, especially
when there is no way of apportioning the
amount in the whole of the judgment or settlement, it can only lead to further litigation,
subterfuge and deceit."
Thus, it is quite obvious that the Arizona court took
a long look at the problem, considering recent cases
on the problem and relevant facets of public policy,
and was correct in holding that there was no right
of subrogation in the State of Arizona on the medical expenses.
One other very recent case which has dealt with
this specific problem is Forsthove vs. Hardware
12

Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 416 S.W.
2nd 208, ( 1967 Mo. App.). In this case Forsthove
was the tort feasor and Farm Bureau was his insurer, and Marks was the injured insured and Hardware Dealers his insurer. Marks' wife was injured
in a collision with the Forsthove vehicle, from which
she died. Hardware Dealers policy contained medical pay provisions similar to those in the present
case, and pursuant to said provision paid to Marks
$1,500 for medical and funeral expenses. After making said payment, Hardware Dealers demanded a
written assignment and subrogation receipt. Subsequently, Marks settled with the tort feasor and its
insurance company. Hardware Dealers had served
notice upon the tort feasor and his insurer, Farm
Bureau, of its subrogation rights. Farm Bureau not
knowing to whom the money should be paid filed a
bill of interpleader, and all were joined in the interpleader action. Marks claimed he was entitled to
the entire settlement amount on the grounds that
the purported assignment to his insurer was prohibited by law. Hardware Dealers claimed that the
policy created an equitable assignment of Marks's
claim for the medical expenses to the extent paid by
Hardware Dealers. Hardware Dealers also made
several alternative claims, one based on restitution
and another for breach of contract. The court rejected all of Hardware Dealers contentions and affirmed the trial court's holding which had held that
Marks was entitled to the full amount of the settle13

ment. The court agreed with the Travelers lndem.
nity Company vs. Chumbley case previously cited
that the cause of action was not assignable due to
public policy considerations to prevent barter and
trade of personal injury actions by injured people
and creditors. The court stated that whether or not
the cause of action survived had no significance in
determining whether the cause of action was assignable under that court's view of the problem. The
court in denying the alternative basis for recovery
in behalf of Hardware Dealers stated that to allow
these claims would be to allow them to do indirectly
what the court had just held they could not do directly. And as the Arizona court had mentioned in
the Harleysville Mutual case, the court also noted
that Marks had paid a premium for this policy and
under the circumstances was entitled to the funeral
expense payment regardless of what further action
he might have taken in bringing suit against the '.
tort feasors. The following are other rather recent
cases which have also recognized the non-assignability of personal injury actions: Putnam vs. Continental Air Transport Company, 297 F. 2nd 501 (CA ,
7, Illinois); Washington vs. Washington, 302 Pac.
2nd 569, California; Clar vs. Dayde County, 116
South 2nd 34, Florida; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Company vs. Reed Construction Company, 132 South
2nd 626, Florida; Remsen vs. Midway Liquors, Inc.,
174 N.E. 2nd 7, Illinois; Juba vs. General Builders
Supply Corporation, 194 N.Y.S. 2nd 503, 163 N.E.
14

2nd 328; Crawford vs. O'Sullivan, 189 N.Y.S. 2nd
724; and Richmond vs. Hanes, 122 S.E. 2nd 895,
Virginia.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the cases
previously cited constitute the desirable result to be
achieved in the present case. This Court has never
strayed from the proposition that the causes of action for personal injury were not assignable. There
is no reason to change that rule today. In fact, as
was pointed out in the cases above, there are very
compelling policy reasons for not allowing subrogation on medical expenses, the most important being:
(1) the creation and encouragement of litigation
and multiple claims, (2) the hindrance to the already difficult road to settlement of personal injury
claims, (3) the barter and trade of personal injury
actions, if the same were made assignable, ( 4) injured party has paid premiums for the coverage and
should be allowed the benefits therefrom. Where a
party has paid premiums on insurance, the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah has confirmed he should
be able to recover the amount due regardless of collateral sources. In the recent case of Phillips vs.
Bennett, 439 Pac. 2nd 457, ________ Utah 2nd -------( 1968), the Supreme Court affirmed the collateraJ
source rule saying that the plaintiff was entitled to
an instruction that insurance proceeds received by
the plaintiff for medical expenses, the premiums
of which were not paid by the defend ant, could not
be used to reduce the judgment for medical specials
15

against tort feasor. The same policy should hold in
the present situation in that if a person has paid
premiums for medical coverage, the insurer should
not be able to defeat that payment under said coverage by inserting in the policy a subrogation clause
in violation of the rule of non-assignability and
clearly against the public interest of the State of
Utah.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFF STA TE FARM HAD GIVEN ADEQUATE NOTICE TO DEFENDANT FARMERS
OF ITS SUBROGATION INTEREST PRIOR TO
DEFENDANT'S SETTLEMENT WITH THE
INSURED SESSIONS.

The present point, of course, becomes pertinent only if the Court should find that the plaintiff
has a right to subrogation. In such event, defendant
contends that the letter of August 4 (Exhibit D-2)
was as a matter of law insufficient to constitut~
notice of State Farm's subrogation rights, and that
a question of fact was created as to whether Farmers had, by August 9, acquired sufficient notice.
Defendant respectfully contends that on such
grounds the summary judgment in plaintiff's favor
was improper.
To clarify the record as to the notice issue, it
should first be noted that the letter in the record
(R. 54) from appellant's counsel to Judge D. Frank
Wilkins who was considering defendant's motion
16

for dismissal wherein counsel indicates there was no
issue as to notice was not intended nor treated by
the parties as a waiver of that issue. At that time
the issue before Judge Wilkins on the motion to dismiss was whether or not a right of subrogation existed and thus whether a cause of action would lie.
In addition, when said letter was sent the contents
of the August 4 letter were not known to appellant's
counsel. At the hearing of plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, the contents of the August 4
letter were known to counsel who there raised the
notice issue without objection from respondent, and
said issue was argued to and considered by the
court.
It has been unanimously recognized in property
damage cases in the absence of fraud or collusion
that no subrogation rights arise when payment is
made by the subrogee insurer after its insured had
settled with a tort feasor. Phillips vs. Worthen, 251
S.W. 2nd 118, Arkansas (1952); Tyre vs. Andrus,
104 A. 2nd 775, Delaware (1954); New York Underwriters Insurance Company vs. Louisville and
N.R. Company, 148 S.W. 2nd 710 Kentucky (1941);
Cleveland vs. Chesapeake and Potomas Telephone
Company, 169 A. 2nd 446, Maryland ( 1961, recognizing the rule); Motorist Mutual Insurance, Company vs. Gerson, 177 N.E. 2nd 790, Ohio (1960, recognizing the rule) ; Service Fire Insurance Company vs. Nicosia, 38 Del. Co. 200 ( 1951) ; Calvert
Fire Insurance Company vs. James, 114 S.E. 2nd
17

832, South Carolina ( 1960); Gulf Insurance C()m.
pany vs. White, 242 S.W. 2nd 663, Texas (1951);
and see the notation in 92 ALR 2nd 112. That same
reasoning clearly applies to situations where the
payment was made prior to the settlement with the
tort feasor but where notice of such subrogation
rights were not given until after said settlement had
been effected.

Some courts have gone one step further and
have held that in order to be effective the notice
must state that payment has been made, and mere
allegation that a claim was being made against the
subrogee was not sufficient notice to raise a subrogation right. In the case of Allstate Insurance
Company vs. Dye, 170 N.E. 2nd 862, Ohio (1960),
the subrogee insurance company gave notice that a
claim had been made under its policy, but such
notice did not state that payment had been made
nor a subrogation receipt executed; and the court .
held that such notice was defective and the tort
feasor was not liable to the insurance company. In
Service Fire Insurance Company vs. Nicosia, 38
Del. Co. 200, Pennsylvania ( 1951), the tort feasor ·
admitted notice had been given but contended that
the notice was insufficient inasmuch as it did not
state that payment had been made by the subrogee.
The court held that such notice was insufficient and
that subrogation rights did not arise until notice of
payment. Although there are a few cases on this
subject, the above cases appear to reflect the rule
18

to be applied in judging the effectiveness of subrogation notice. In the present case the letter of August 4, 1967, is wholly deficient as notice in that it
fails to state that payment has been made, and in
fact affirmatively states that it has not been called
upon to make payment, and in addition characterizes plaintiff's interest as only "possible interest."
The letter merely speaks of a possible subrogation,
and thus if viewed in light of the above cited cases
the notice is obviously deficient. Appellant urges
this Court to apply the criteria above set forth to
the present case and find the letter of August 4 was
insufficient notice.
With the letter of August 4 failing as notice,
the question then arises as to whether defendant
Farmers did, prior to August 9, have notice of the
August 4 payments. No evidence was available at
the summary judgment hearing upon which to decide that issue. The defendants there suggested that
such issue should be resolved before a summary
judgment against the defendant would be proper;
however, the court proceeded to rule on the notice
without further evidence. As the evidence stands
now, the notice was insufficient and thus it would
be incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce evidence
of knowledge by defendant prior to August 9 in
order to raise a right of subrogation, if in fact one
so exists. The notice issue being very material should
have been thoroughly examined by the finder of
fact before judgment against defendant could be
justified. On this basis, defendant claims error.
19

SUMMARY
Defendant respectfully submits that to allow
the plaintiff to subrogate on medical expenses would
merely open up a new Pandora's box with the resulting multiplication of suits, the juggling around
of all of the medical expense carriers trying to become secondary rather than primary, the trafficking of such causes of action, and other previously
mentioned undesirable social results. In addition
such subrogation is in fact the splitting of a cause
of action for personal injuries and constitutes an
illegal asignment of the same. Although there may
be some advantages to the insurance companies in
allowing said subrogation, the disadvantages greatly
outweigh the advantages. Defendant thus prays
that the Court rule as a matter of law that there is
no right of subrogation for medical expenses in the
State of Utah and that the summary judgment
granted to the plaintiff by the lower court be re·
versed and the case dismissed. If this Court should,
however, find there is a right of subrogation, de·
fendant submits that the court erred in ruling as a
matter of law on the issue of notice inasmuch as the
letter of August 4 was insufficient to raise the right
of subrogation and until the plaintiff could prove
by further evidence that there was actual notice, the
court erred m granting judgment against the de·
fendant.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Attorneys for Appellant

